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Abstract
In this paper, we present an experimental test of a bidding game identical to the one seen on the
television game show “the price is right”. Four players make sequential guesses about the price
of an item and the player whose guess is closest to the price without exceeding it wins the item.
Patterns of suboptimal behavior in our experimental data are consistent with ﬁeld data from the
actual game show analyzed by Berk et al. [Am. Econ. Rev. 86 (1996) 954]. Several treatments that
simplify the game are used to identify factors that cause subgame perfection to predict poorly.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: C7; C9
Keywords: Price is right; Experiment; Bidding; Subgame perfection
1. Introduction
Subgame perfection is a powerful equilibrium concept that can be very effective in nar-
rowing down the set of Nash equilibria in a dynamic game. Although the logical rationale
for subgame perfection is compelling, for outcomes to reﬂect it, individuals must reason
backward in time through the extensive form of the game, and this may be unnatural for
many individuals. The descriptive power of subgame perfection is challenging to study be-
cause, other than with experimental techniques, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd dynamic interactions in
whichtherulesareexplicitlystatedandoptimalstrategiesareknownandstraightforwardto
calculate. However, Berk et al. (1996), hereafter BHV, study a novel data set that has these
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features as well as very high monetary stakes for players. BHV gather data from a bidding
game played on a popular television program, the price is right, in which four players bid
for a prize that typically has a value of over US$ 1000.
The rules of the bidding game are the following. Four bidders, who are presented with a
commonly-used commercially-sold item, each submit a guess of the retail price of the item.
The four bidders announce their guesses, which we will refer to as bids in this paper, pub-
licly and in sequence so that the guesses of previous bidders are known at the time a player
makes his decision. The player whose bid is the closest to the actual retail price without
exceeding the price receives the item and the possibility of winning more prizes later in
the program. If all four bids exceed the actual price, the bidding process is repeated. The
winner does not make any payment in exchange for receiving the item.2 The game has the
attractive feature that it is constant-sum: departures from subgame perfection do not occur
becausethereexistgainsfromcooperation,suchasinrepeatedprisoners’dilemmas(Selten
and Stoecker, 1986) or in the centipede game (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992), nor because
of losses from disagreement as in the ultimatum bargaining game (Guth et al., 1982).
Intheiranalysisofthedatafromthepriceisright,BHVﬁndmajordiscrepanciesbetween
the data from the television program and the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bidding
game. For example, it is always optimal for bidder 4 (the fourth and last mover) in the game
to either (a) cutoff one of the other three bidders by bidding higher than the other bidder by
the minimum permissible bid increment, or to (b) bid the minimum possible value. BHV
observe that in over 43 percent of instances, players do not choose from that simple subset
of their strategy set. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, players make bids in descending
order; the ﬁrst player submits the highest bid, the fourth player the lowest. However, in
BHVs data, players bid in descending order in only 3.76 percent of games. The dichotomy
between observed and optimal behavior is striking given the high stakes involved, and the
simple rules guiding the best response of player four.
In this paper, we construct an experiment to explore the stark differences between the
theoretical predictions and the data from the game show.3 The conclusions reached from
2 Thegameisofindependentinteresttoeconomists,becauseitisequivalenttoothersituationsthatariseinindus-
trial organization. In one example, a situation in location theory, consider four ﬁrms deciding where to locate their
businesses (say gasoline stations) on a one-way street or highway. Trafﬁc enters at various points along the street
and stops at the ﬁrst business it encounters. Each of the ﬁrms would like to locate in such a way as to maximize the
percentage of incoming trafﬁc that reaches it before reaching another ﬁrm. Another example, modeled by Cancian
etal.(1995),istheschedulingoftelevisioneveningnewsbycompetingnetworks.Thisisanalogoustotheone-way
location situation described above in that each network chooses the time to schedule its newscast to maximize
the number of viewers for whom its newscast is the ﬁrst they see after arriving home at the end of the workday.
3 Friedman (1998) and Cason and Tenorio (2001) conduct experiments similar in spirit to ours. Friedman’s
experiment is based on Monty Hall’s three-door problem on the television game show “let’s make a deal.” He
ﬁnds signiﬁcant increases in the incidence of optimal decisions when subjects are required keep track of how their
earnings compared with their hypothetical earnings had they pursued alternative strategies. Optimal behavior was
alsomorelikelywhensubjectswereshowntheresultsofthedecisionsofothersubjects.CasonandTenorioconsider
another game that occurs in the price is right game show. In the game, three players, who move sequentially, each
have an opportunity to spin a wheel twice that randomly generates a number from a discrete uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. The numbers generated by the two spins are added to form a score, and the player whose score is closest
to but does not exceed 1 wins the game. A player may forego his second spin if he chooses and count the amount
of the ﬁrst spin as his total score. The authors compare behavior in the game show to the behavior observed in a
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our study of this particular game are used to propose conjectures about the types of games
in which subgame perfect equilibria might be more likely to be observed. Our analysis of
the price is right bidding game proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst replicate properties of the data
observed in the game show. We then alter the structure of the game to determine where the
failure of subgame perfection arises.
The ﬁrst avenue we pursue to look for the source of the failure is to consider whether
the public nature of decisions causes deviations from subgame perfection. BHV argue that
the lack of cutting off behavior is not due to fear of reciprocal cutoffs in response. They
cite the fact that cutting other players off early in the game does not lead to an increased
likelihood of being cutoff in the future. Nevertheless there may exist a social cost to being
seen as cutting others off, and it might be viewed as undesirable to be observed doing so.
We isolate this effect by running a treatment in which player anonymity is increased, in
that other players cannot associate an individual’s actions and his identity, and compare




second avenue we explore is whether the lack of optimal behavior is due to the possibility
of resale of the unit in the case that all bids are greater than the actual price. The optimality
of cutting off or bidding at the lower bound is dependent on assumptions about future play.
If cutoffs induce changes in strategies of other players in the resale round, they may not be
optimal to employ. The possibility that there may always be a resale round means that there
is no ﬁnite extensive form and therefore it is impossible to reason logically through all of
the decision nodes in all possible subgames. We consider this issue by studying data from
games with no resale, in which the maximum number of moves for each player is one.
Another reason that decisions may deviate from the optimum is the existence of strategic
uncertainty. Decisions early in the game tree are only going to be optimal if early movers
believe that future play is likely to be optimal. Subgame perfect equilibria are only likely
to be observed if it is common knowledge that future movers will behave rationally. We
study this possibility by considering a version of the game with three players and no resale.
The existence of fewer players does not simplify the decision of the last mover, but it
changesthebackwardinductionproblemthatmustbesolvedbytheﬁrstandsecondmovers,
who must anticipate the actions of later movers. The next section describes the game and
the procedures of the experiment. Section 3 presents our hypotheses about behavior and
outcomes. In Section 4 we present our results, and in Section 5 we provide a summary and
some concluding remarks.
2. Procedures
The experiment consisted of nine sessions. All of the sessions were conducted in class-
rooms or computer labs in the Krannert School of Management at Purdue University, and
observe a similar pattern of suboptimal behavior. The player who moves ﬁrst tends to decline to make a second
spin when the probability that the sum of the two spins exceeds one is high, even when it is optimal for the player
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the subjects participating in this experiment consisted entirely of undergraduate students
from Purdue University. In each session, subjects played the price is right bidding game
50 times. We will refer to each play of the game as a period. The winner of each period
was awarded US$ 2 for a maximum total of US$ 100 payment given to each group of four
subjects. Sessions took on average approximately 2h.
2.1. The public treatments
Sessions 1–4, which constituted the public/resale/4bidders (PR4) treatment, were con-
ducted by hand. In each of these four sessions, there were four subjects, who interacted
with each other for 50 periods. Participants were seated at desks facing the chalkboard. The
instructions for the experiment were read aloud as participants followed along with printed
copies. The instructions were available for reference for the duration of the experiment.
Subjects were then given a chance to ask questions regarding the procedure of the exper-
iment. Following the instructions, one practice period of the experiment was conducted
which did not count for money. After the practice period, 50 periods were conducted with
monetary payments. The data were recorded both on paper and on the chalkboard. At any
time, subjects could observe the history of all subjects’ actions from between 10 and 20
immediately preceding periods.
The timing of activity in each individual period was as follows. After 15s, the experi-
menter signaled to bidder 1 that he could declare an integer between 1 and 1000 (inclusive)
whenever he was ready. The 15-s interval was meant to encourage subjects to take time
to analyze the decision situation they faced. After bidder 1 verbally submitted his num-
ber, it was recorded on the chalkboard so that all other subjects could observe the choice.
After another 15-s delay, bidder 2 was allowed to submit her number. Again, the number
was recorded on the chalkboard. This same process continued with bidders 3 and 4. After
bidder 4’s number was recorded on the chalkboard, the experimenter rolled a 10-sided die
and a 100-sided die simultaneously. The 10-sided die had values 0–9 and the 100-sided
die had values 0–99. The two numbers were concatenated to form a three-digit number
with the 10-sided die representing the ﬁrst digit and the 100-sided die representing the last
two. If both dice returned zero, the experimenter’s number was 1000. The subjects were
occasionally given the chance to roll the dice and to read the numbers.
After the experimenter’s number was recorded on the chalkboard, if the experimenter’s
numberwasgreaterthanatleastoneplayer’snumber,thewinnerfortheperiodwasselected.
The winner was the bidder whose choice was closest to the experimenter’s number without
exceeding it. The winner’s bid was circled, he was informed that he had won US$ 2, and
the experiment proceeded to the next period. A second experimenter seated at the back of
the room recorded on paper all of the data from the chalkboard.
Insessions1–4,ifallfourbidders’numbersweregreaterthantheexperimenter’snumber,
then no winner was determined, and play continued with a resale round. The procedure for
resale rounds was identical to the initial round of each period. When described to the
subjects, a resale round was labeled in a way that underscored the link between the original
round and the resale round. For example, period 3.1 was the ﬁrst resale round in period 3.
If all bidders’ numbers were again greater than the experimenter’s number in period 3.1,
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would be awarded if all four numbers were greater than the experimenter’s number and
that resale rounds would continue until a winner was determined for the period. Subjects
were also reminded that 50 periods would be played during the session (not including the
practice period at the beginning), so it was common knowledge that the US$ 2 prize would
be awarded exactly 50 times.
In sessions 1 and 2, subjects rotated positions after 25 periods in a pattern where the
subject initially acting as bidder 4 and the subject initially acting as bidder 1 switched roles,
as did those subjects acting as bidders 2 and 3. In sessions 3–4 and 6–9, subjects rotated
once every 10 periods, so that the subject initially acting as bidder 1 became bidder 4 after
10 periods, bidder 3 after the 20th period, bidder 2 after the 30th period, and ﬁnally bidder
1 for the ﬁnal 10 periods. All other subjects were rotated in the same order of “1–4–3–2–1”,
that is 10 periods in the role of player 1 was followed by 10 periods in the role of player 4,
followed by 3, etc. This rotation scheme encouraged backward induction since the subject
acting as bidder 3 had previously been acting as bidder 4 and thus understood bidder 4’s
incentive to cutoff certain bids. The rotation scheme also allowed a subject to rotate from
the “powerless” bidder 1 position to the “powerful” bidder 4 position and reciprocate the
behavior of the other three players.
Sessions 6 and 7, which are referred to as the public/noresale/4bidder (PN4) treatment,
differed from 1 to 4 only in that there was no resale round. There was exactly one round
playedfor50periods.Thismeantthattherecouldbelessthan50prizessoldoverthecourse
of the session. Sessions 8 and 9 were identical to the PN4 sessions except for the fact that
there were three bidders rather than four, and are designated as the PN3 treatment.
2.2. The anonymity treatment AR4
Session 5, which constituted the anonymity/resale/4bidder (AR4) treatment, was com-
puterized and consisted of three groups interacting simultaneously in a large computer lab.
These three sessions increased the level of anonymity in the experiment by ensuring that
subjects could not associate the actions and the identity of other players. Under the AR4
treatment, the 12 subjects were spaced throughout the lab and instructed to direct their Web
browser to the experiment’s Web site. Each subject was given a unique login ID and pass-
word. The players received a game name and a starting player number. They then reviewed
instructions explaining the bidding procedure and the use of the Web page for viewing
and submitting bids. Subjects were given printed copies of these instructions to which they
could refer throughout the experiment.
We conducted 50 periods, not including one practice period that did not count toward
subjects’earnings.Eachroundconsistedofthefollowingsequenceofevents:Afterlogging
intotheirassignedgame,eachsubjectcontinuallyviewedatablewhichdisplayedtheround
number, each of the bidders’ bids as they were made, the experimenter’s number, and the
winningnumberforeachofthepreviousrounds,includingthecurrentround.Atthebottom
of the table was a status bar that indicated how much money the subject had won during
the course of the experiment.
At the beginning of the round, bidder 1’s browser displayed a pop-up window into which
hewasabletoinputanumberafter15s.Afterenteringthenumber,allplayerssawitappear
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pop-up window after a 15s delay into which she could enter a number. Again, the number
was immediately made available to all other players in the game. The process continued
with bidders 3 and 4.
After bidder 4 entered her number, the computer randomly generated a number from a
discrete uniform distribution between 1 and 1000 and determined the winner. The experi-
menter’s number and the winning player’s number were highlighted in all of the players’
tables. The game was then advanced to the next period. If all players entered numbers
greater than the experimenter’s number, then the next round was a resale round (labeled,
for example, 3.1 for the ﬁrst resale round of period 3) and a “0” was placed in the column
of the table labeled “winner”. The resale round process continued until a winner for the
period was determined.
After 10 periods, the Web browser instructed subjects to log out of their game and log





her off, one risked a 2/3 probability of cutting off the wrong player.4 After the 10th period
of the 5th rotation (the 50th period in total), the subjects were told to sit quietly until all
players were ﬁnished, so that the last group of four subjects to ﬁnish could not identify the
other members of their group.
3. Hypotheses
3.1. Hypotheses derived from game theory
BHV derived several testable game theoretic propositions about behavior in the game.
They require varying degrees of rationality, and we generally interpret more support for
them in different treatments as evidence of a greater degree of rational behavior in that
treatment. Hypotheses 1a–c concern the strategies chosen in the experiment.
Hypothesis 1a. Local best response strategies: the last bidder cuts off one of the previous
bidders or bids 1.
Hypothesis 1b. Optimal last mover behavior: the last bidder chooses the element from the
set of four actions listed in Hypothesis 1a that maximizes his probability of winning.
Hypothesis 1c. Subgame perfect ordering: players bid in descending order.
4 In principle, a subject could calculate the current position of a player who cut her off earlier under the
assumption that all bidders followed the same rotation. However, there was no way that she could be certain that
all players rotated in the same pattern as she did. Furthermore, it would take at least three rotations before players
could reasonably conjecture the entire rotation scheme. We used the 1–4–3–2–1 rotation scheme in the anonymity
treatment, because it facilitated a direct comparison with the data from sessions 3 and 4, which used the same
rotation scheme.P. Healy, C. Noussair/J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 54 (2004) 231–247 237
Hypothesis 1a requires that the last bidder choose a strategy from a set of “local” best
response strategies, where the local best responses yield a strictly higher payoff than any
other strategy in some interval above the local best response. It can be easily shown that
adopting any strategy that does not involve cutting off a previous bidder or bidding 1 is
not a best response strategy. For example, if the ﬁrst three bidders submit bids of 100,
600, and 750, the four actions of bidder four that are local best responses consistent with
Hypothesis 1a are 101, 601, 751 and 1. Every other strategy yields a strictly lower expected
payoff than the largest local best response below the given strategy. For example, a strategy
of submitting 200 gives a lower expected payoff than submitting 101. By submitting 200,
bidder 4 wins at any price between 200 and 600, a 40.1 percent chance of winning in the
current round in addition to a probability of winning in a future round if the item has to be
resold. By submitting 101, bidder 4 wins at any price between 101 and 600, a 50 percent
chance of winning in the current round in addition to the probability of winning by resale.
Each of the four local best response strategies consistent with Hypothesis 1a leads to a
certainprobabilityofwinning.Bypickingthelowestnumberintheappropriateinterval,the
fourth bidder maximizes his probability of winning. Hypothesis 1b is that the fourth bidder
chooses the one local best response strategy that gives him the highest expected return
for the entire period. In the example in the last paragraph, the probabilities of winning
for the four actions are (a) for 101, 0.5 + 0.1 (probability of winning on resale); (b) for
601, 0.2 + 0.1 (probability of winning on resale); (c) for 751, 0.25 + 0.1 (probability of
winning on resale); and (d) for 1, 0.1. Thus the option with the highest expected payoff for
bidder 4 would be to bid 101, and Hypothesis 1b predicts that 101 would be chosen in the
example.5
Hypothesis1cisapropertyofthesubgameperfectequilibriumofthegame.SeeBHVfor
a derivation. For the PR4 and AR4 treatments, in which the distribution of prices is drawn
from a discrete uniform distribution on the interval [1, 1000], the actions chosen along the
subgame perfect equilibrium path are bidder 1 bids 779, bidder 2 bids 557, bidder 3 bids
334 and bidder 4 bids 1. In PN4, the equilibrium bids of the four players are 751, 501, 251
and 1. In PN3, they are 668, 334, and 1.
Subgame perfection requires strong assumptions about players’ beliefs. In particular, it
requires common knowledge that later movers in the game are rational. However, weaker
assumptions about the beliefs of the four subjects place some restrictions on outcomes.
Suppose that each subject has “rational expectations” in the sense that he knows (a) the
distribution of the true price of the item; and (b) his probability of winning the prize given
hispositioninthebiddingorder.BHVshowthatunderthesetwoassumptionstheoutcomes
must have the properties described in Hypotheses 2a and b.
SupportforHypotheses2aandbisconsideredasafailuretorejectassumptions(a)and(b)
concerning rational expectations. The methodology of the experiment includes informing
the subjects about the distribution of experimenter prices and using physical devices (dice)
5 In their analysis, BHV make the assumption that bidders will choose the same strategies in resale rounds as
they did in the initial round; the probability of any given bidder winning the period can be found by the formula
p(Win $2) = (p(Wincurrentround))/(1−p(resaleroundoccurs)). To see that this is true, consider that if a is the
probability that player 4 wins the current round and b is the probability that nobody wins the current round, thus
forcing a resale round, and if all players chose the same bids on all subsequent resale rounds, then the probability
of winning the US$ 2 is the inﬁnite series a + b(a + b(a +···=a(1/(1 − b)).238 P. Healy, C. Noussair/J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 54 (2004) 231–247
to convince the subjects that they indeed face a uniform distribution. This represents an
attempt to impose assumption (a). Assumption (b), that the subjects correctly anticipate
their probability of winning, is presumably more and more likely to be satisﬁed as subjects
repeat the process over the course of their session.
Hypothesis 2c requires that the winning probabilities be those that occur in the subgame
perfect equilibrium. BHV derive the results for the case of four bidders and resale, but it is
straightforward to show that analogous results hold in the absence of resale.
Hypothesis 2a. Rational expectations payoff ranking: the last bidder wins with at least as
high a probability as the next-to-last bidder. The next-to-last bidder wins with at least as
high a probability as any previous bidder.
Hypothesis 2b. RE payoff lower bounds: if there are four bidders, and resale is possible,
the fourth bidder wins with a probability of at least 1/3. If there are four bidders, and resale
is not possible, the fourth bidder wins with a probability of at least 1/4. If there are three
bidders, and resale is not possible, the third bidder wins with a probability of at least 1/3.
Hypothesis 2c. Subgame perfect ordering: if there are four bidders and resale is possible,
the ﬁrst three bidders win with probability 2/9 and the fourth bidder wins with probability
1/3. If there are four bidders and no resale is possible, each bidder wins with probability
1/4. With three bidders and no resale, each bidder wins with probability 1/3.
3.2. Bounded rationality
We explore several possibilities about the source of the departures from subgame per-
fection that BHV identify. They are listed below as Hypotheses 3a–d. Hypothesis 3a, that
decisions accord more with the predictions of rational models after repetition of the game,
focusesonapatternthatistypicalofmanyexperimentalstudies,particularlythoseinvolving
interactions that are complex. Although most contestants on the TV game show that BHV
analyze presumably have considerable experience watching the show before participating,
theirexperienceconsistsofobservationratherthanpriorparticipation.Intheexperimentwe
are able to track behavior of the same individuals over 50 rounds and observe any changes
over time. If Hypothesis 3a is supported, it would suggest that sufﬁcient experience would
reduce or eliminate the anomalous behavior.
Hypothesis 3b notes that behavior is more consistent with the subgame perfect equi-
librium under the AR4 treatment than under PR4. As we suggested in the introduction,
players may not wish to be seen cutting off others. If this is the case, the anonymity pro-
vided in the AR4 treatment would lead to more cutoff behavior. The anticipation of cutoff
behavior would then lead to behavior more consistent with the subgame perfect equilib-
rium on the part of earlier movers. The only difference between the two treatments (other
than the computerized interface in AR4) is the inability to associate players’ decisions and
identity.
Hypothesis 3c claims that removing the ability to resell would lead to behavior more
in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium. The absence of resale ensures that
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each player’s strategy must specify their action at each possible decision node in any num-
ber of potential resale rounds, and players must form beliefs about how others will bid in
the resale round. Because of the existence of so many additional subgames that are intro-
duced with resale, the computational burden is eased considerably if no resale is possible.
The hypothesis is evaluated by comparing the data from PR4 and PN4. Hypothesis 3d
has a similar spirit and suggests that decisions would be more consistent with subgame
perfection in a three-player version of the game with no resale. This type of simpliﬁca-
tion would further ease the computational burden for players other than the last mover,
although there is no reason to suppose that it would directly simplify the decision of
the last mover. Hypothesis 3d therefore applies with particular force to Hypotheses 1c,
2b and c, which depend on behavior of players other than the last mover, asserting that
those hypotheses are more likely to be supported under PN3 than under PN4.
Hypothesis 3a. Support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 increases with repetition of the game.
Hypothesis 3b. Support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 increases when decisions are anonymous.
Hypothesis 3c. Support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 increases when there is no resale of the
item.
Hypothesis 3d. Support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 increases when there are fewer players.
3.3. Reciprocity
Hypothesis four concerns the incidence of cutoff behavior and its dependence on the
number of cutoffs experienced and observed. Hypothesis 4a asserts the existence of recip-
rocal cutoffs. According to the hypothesis, subject i is more likely to cutoff another subject
j the more often j has cut him off previously. This is consistent with the exercise of revenge
for earlier cutoffs. Hypotheses 4b and c concern the presence and nature of the learning
process on the part of agents and the way subjects learn cutoff behavior. Hypothesis 4b
asserts the existence of behavior that is consistent with learning about the optimality of
cutting off from the experience of being cutoff. The hypothesis claims that subject i, af-
ter he has been cutoff by subject j, will be more likely to cutoff subjects other than j.
Hypothesis 4c asserts that subject i is more likely to cutoff subject j the more total cutoffs
he observes of players other than himself, therefore learning to cutoff by observing cutoff
behavior.
Hypothesis 4a. If subject j cuts off subject i, the likelihood that i cuts off j increases.
Hypothesis 4b. If subject i is cutoff by subject j, the likelihood that i cuts off subject k
increases.
Hypothesis4c. Ifsubjectkiscutoffbysubjectj,thelikelihoodthaticutsoffothersubjects
increases.240 P. Healy, C. Noussair/J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 54 (2004) 231–247
4. Results
4.1. Tests of game theoretic predictions and comparison to BHV
Table 1 indicates the percentage of bids that were consistent with Hypotheses 1a and b in
each treatment. The last player’s bid is a local best response in the sense of Hypothesis 1a if
it cuts off a previous bid or is equal to 1. The bid is optimal in the sense of Hypothesis 1b if
it maximizes the probability of winning, taking into account the possibility of resale where
appropriate.Thedatainthethirdcolumnarethepercentageofchoicesthatare“near”alocal
best response strategy, deﬁned as less than 50 above another bidder’s choice or between 1
and 50. These data account for bids that satisfy Hypothesis 1a if a margin of 50 is allowed.
The data in Table 1 for the PR4 treatment indicate that the incidence of use of local best
responsestrategiesisataboutthesamelevelasinthedataofBHV.Bidder4cutsoffanother
bidder or bids 1 for 63.6 percent of the time compared to 56.5 percent of the time in the
BHV study. In the ﬁrst 10 periods of our PR4 treatment, it is 53.3 percent. However, we
obtain considerably stronger support for Hypothesis 1a if we classify choices less than 50
currency units above a local best response action as consistent with the hypothesis. The
third column comprises at most 20 percent of the possible range of bids but accounts for
79 percent of the total observations in PR4. The proportion of decisions that are exactly
optimal is 46.3 percent.
TheincidenceoflocalbestresponseandoptimaldecisionsishigherundertheAnonymous
treatment. The incidence of decisions that are optimal increases from 46.3 to 57.2 percent
under anonymity, and larger increases occur for the two measures of consistency with
Hypothesis 1a. A pooled variance t-test rejects the hypothesis that the incidence of local
best response behavior is equal in the two treatments at P<0.05 (t = 2.17). We also reject
thehypothesisthattheincidenceofoptimalbehaviorisequalatP<0.05(t = 1.97).Forthe
percentage of bids that are optimal in the sense of Hypothesis 1a while allowing a positive
deviation of 50, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality between the two treatments
at P = 0.05 (t = 1.46). Anonymity appears to encourage some players to cutoff others
when they would bid up to 50 higher than a cutoff strategy if their decisions were made
public.
Table 1
Percentage of bids consistent with Hypotheses 1a and b, all treatments
Session Percentage of bids
that are local best
responses
Percentage of bids that are
less than 50 greater than a
local best response bid
Percentage of bids
that are optimal
PR4/all data 63.6 79.0 46.3
PR4/last 10 periods 72.9 81.3 43.8
AR4/all data 80.3 92.4 57.2
AR4/last 10 periods 74.4 94.9 61.5
PN4/all data 81.0 91.0 58.0
PN4/last 10 periods 60 90 40
PN3/all data 76.0 93.0 61.0
PN3/last 10 periods 100 100 80
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Removing the possibility of resale induces an increase of similar magnitude in the inci-
dence of optimal and local best response behavior as the introduction of anonymity. The
hypothesis that the incidence of local best response behavior is identical between PR4 and
PN4 can be rejected at P<0.05 (t = 2.03) and the analogous hypothesis can be rejected
for optimal behavior (t = 1.89). However, when an interval of 50 is allowed as a positive
deviation from a local best response strategy, the hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected
at conventional signiﬁcance levels (t = 1.18). The hypotheses of equality of the three mea-
sures between PN4 and PN3 cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. However, the table
shows that for the last 10 periods of PN3, all decisions the last mover takes are local best
responses and 80 percent are optimal. Thus, removing the resale property, reducing the
number of agents to three, and giving players sufﬁcient experience induces highly optimal
decisions and essentially eliminates the anomalous behavior.
Although experience seems to improve decisions in the PN3 treatment, experience does
not appear to have a positive effect overall. While decisions in PR4 and PN3 are better
than average in the last 10 periods, those in AR4 and PN4 are not. The dynamics whereby
decisions of the last mover change over time are explored later in Section 4.2.
Table 2 shows the winning percentage by bidder and allows us to consider the level of
support for hypothesis two. The table indicates considerable support for Hypotheses 2a
and b, but not for 2c. The last mover wins more often than any of the other players in all
treatments. The next-to-last mover wins more often than the earlier movers in all cases but
one (in PR4, player 1 wins very slightly more often than player 3). The frequencies of the
last mover winning are consistent with Hypothesis 2b in all cases. However, Hypothesis 2c,
which stipulates win frequencies consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium, is not
supported. Late movers tend to take advantage of non-equilibrium play of earlier movers
and win with greater probability than under the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Tables 3 and 4 show the frequency of each possible ordering of the magnitude of bids
in a single round, from greatest to least. Table 3 contains the pooled data from PR4 and
AR4 as well as from PN4, while Table 4 contains the data from PN3. The subgame perfect
equilibriumorderingis1234(forPN3itis123).Biddersbidindescendingorder.Thedatain
thetablerevealthatHypothesis1cisﬁrmlyrejectedinthedatafromfourplayergameswith
resale, as it is in the empirical analysis of BHV. Bidders rarely bid in descending order, as
they would in the subgame perfect equilibrium. The frequencies are close to those reported
byBHV.Only1.69percentofthetimeisthebiddingordertheonepredictedinthesubgame
Table 2
Winning percentages by player, all treatments
Session First player Second player Third player Fourth player
PR4/all data 20.2 17.5 20.0 42.4
PR4 predicted 22.2 22.2 22.2 33.3
AR4/all data 13.2 21.1 21.6 41.2
AR4 predicted 22.2 22.2 22.2 33.3
PN4/all data 10.7 11.9 28.6 48.8
PN4 predicted 25 25 25 25
PN3/all data 19.6 26.1 54.3 –
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Table 3
Bidding order percentages, four-player data, all sessions
Bidding order
(descending)
Percentage of periods sequence is








1234a 1.69 3.76 6.0
1243 7.00 2.42 8.0
1324 2.42 4.84 3.0
1342 4.35 2.69 3.0
1423 5.31 3.76 3.0
1432 9.90 3.23 6.0
2134 3.14 2.96 4.0
2143 6.04 4.30 10.0
2314 1.45 2.69 5.0
2341 1.45 2.69 1.0
2413 3.14 1.34 5.0
2431 3.62 4.03 3.0
3124 3.86 4.30 4.0
3142 4.35 3.50 3.0
3214 3.86 6.99 7.0
3241 3.62 3.76 7.0
3412 2.17 2.96 1.0
3421 4.35 4.57 3.0
4123 3.38 4.57 1.0
4132 6.28 3.76 5.0
4213 3.62 5.91 2.0
4231 2.90 3.23 1.0
4312 4.35 5.65 3.0
4321 7.73 12.10 6.0
Thenumbersaregivenindescendingorder.Forexample,2314meansthatplayer2(thebidderthatmovedsecond),
made the highest bid. Player 3 made the second highest bid, etc.
a Indicates subgame perfect ordering.
perfect equilibrium. In contrast, if bidding were completely random, the bids would be in
descending order 4.2 percent of the time. In our data, as well as the data of BHV, each of the
24 possible orderings occurs in at least 1 percent of the rounds, representing a remarkable
degree of variability in outcomes. Similar patterns are obtained in PN4. However, in PN3
Table 4
Bidding order percentages, three-player data, all sessions
Bidding
order
Percentage of periods sequence is
observed: PN3, all periods
Percentage of periods sequence is
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the three bids are in declining order in 29 percent and bidder three is the lowest bidder in
54 percent of all periods, considerably greater than if bidding were random (16.7 percent
would be in declining order and 33.3 percent of the time, the last mover would be the low
bidder). In the last 10 periods, 40 percent of plays result in the predicted ordering, and
player 3 is the low bidder in 70 percent of periods. This is further indication that the PN3
treatment induces decisions closer to equilibrium behavior.
4.2. Bounded rationality and reciprocity
We consider here the dynamics over time in cutoff behavior. In particular, we study the
effect of several plausible factors that can account for changes in the incidence of cutoff
behavior over time. We estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable cts
ij takes on
a value of 1 if player i cuts off player j in round s of period t. cts
ij equals zero if i fails to
cutoff j. Only the observations where it is optimal for i to cutoff j and where i is the last
moverintheroundareincludedintheestimation.Theﬁrstinﬂuenceoncutoffbehaviorthat
we consider is pure experience with the decision situation. A positive coefﬁcient on period,
which takes on a value from 1 to 50 equal to the current period number, would indicate that
thereisatrendovertimethatothervariablescannotexplainandwouldsuggestanincreasein
cutoff behavior related purely to deductive reasoning independent of the number of cutoffs
observed or experienced. The second variable is anonymous, which takes on a value of 1 if
thedataarefromtheAR4treatment.Thethirdvariable,cutoffsobserved,equalsthenumber
of times that any player cuts off a player k  = i. A positive coefﬁcient on cutoffs observed
would indicate that subjects who observe more cutoffs are more likely to cutoff others later.
This may occur if observation of the cutoff strategy makes players recognize its optimality
or increase their willingness to employ it.
The variable cutoff by others indicates the number of times that i has himself been cutoff
by a player k  = j. If the coefﬁcient of this variable is positive, there an additional tendency
for players to respond to being cutoff by adopting cutoff behavior themselves beyond the
effect of cutoffs observed. It would suggest that experiencing a cutoff is an especially
powerful way to illustrate its optimality. The variable cutoff by j is the number of times
that i has been cutoff by j. Positive signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient of this variable would
indicate the presence of reciprocity, since it would reveal that players are especially likely
to target players who cut them off for reciprocation. The data reported in Table 5 are logit
estimates with dependent variable cts
ij and the independent variables given above.6 Only the
observations for which it is optimal for i to cutoff j are included.
BHVﬁndintheirdatathatplayersweremorelikelytoadoptalocalbestresponsestrategy
iftheyhadobservedonepreviously,buttherewasnoadditionaleffectfrombeingthemselves
the victims of a cutoff. That is, learning the optimality of cutoff behavior from observation
was as effective as from experience. BHV also found no evidence of reciprocal cutting off
6 Cutoff by others, number of times the subject currently acting as bidder 4 has been cutoff between periods 1
and t −1 (inclusive) by players other than j; cutoffs observed, total number of times that players other than i have
been cutoff in the session between periods 1 and t − 1 (inclusive); period, number of periods that have already
elapsed in the current session; cutoff by j, total number of times that subject j cutoff subject i before the current
period; cutoff by others, total number of times that subjects other than j cutoff subject i before the current period;































































Estimates of model of cutoff behavior
Equation and data
used
Constant Period Anonymous Cutoff by j Cutoff by others Cutoffs observed Log-likelihood
Four players with
resale
−0.5278a (0.2572) −0.0572a (0.0169) 0.1957 (0.2220) −0.0460 (0.0599) −0.0208 (0.0366) 0.1169a (0.0192) −244.51 (400 obs.)
Four players
without resale
−0.4457 (0.4786) 0.0942 (0.0736) – −0.1896 (0.2081) −0.1011 (0.1831) −0.0514 (0.0800) −44.951 (68 obs.)
Three players
without resale
−1.999a (0.7255) 0.0546 (0.0653) – 0.2418 (0.2165) −0.6348 (0.3722) 0.1034 (0.1530) −26.116 (53 obs.)
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behavior. Cutting off a player did not appear to lead to future revenge because the player
was no likelier to be cutoff in subsequent rounds than if she had not cutoff another player.
The estimates we obtain with the data from 4 players and resale, also shown in Table 5, lead
to the same conclusions. The variable cutoffs observed is positive and signiﬁcant indicating
that subjects cutoff others more often, the more cutoffs they observe. BHV interpret this
effect as indicating that subjects are not aware beforehand of the optimality of the strategy
and learn it from experience. We believe that it is a more plausible explanation in that it is
a priori not common knowledge that reciprocation does not occur for cutoffs and subjects
learn this as they repeat the game.
The variable cutoff by others is insigniﬁcant. This indicates that there is no marginal
increase in cutoff behavior from a player who has been cutoff. This is also in agreement
withtheﬁndingsofBHVthatthereisnoadditionalcutoffbehaviorinducedbyanexperience
of being personally cutoff. The variable cutoff by j is not signiﬁcant, indicating that there is
no tendency toward direct reciprocity in the data. These effects are all consistent with BHV
although somewhat at odds with other experimental research (see for example, Fehr et al.,
1993 or Fehr and Gächter, 2000) in which reciprocation is a prominent feature of the data.
Thecoefﬁcientonperiodissigniﬁcantlynegative,indicatingthatifnocutoffbehavioroccurs
in a period, future cutoff behavior is less likely. Anonymous is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that
thepresenceofanonymityitselfdidnotincreasetheprobabilityofacutoff,holdingconstant
the previous history of cutoff behavior in the session.
The results from the estimation are different when no resale occurs. The three-player
treatment PN3 is of particular interest because of the results reported previously suggesting
behaviorwasrelativelyclosetoequilibriumbehavior.Weinterprettheestimatesasreﬂecting
a better understanding of the game. Cutoffs observed is insigniﬁcant, which indicates that
players were not made aware of the optimality of the cutoff strategy by observing it and
suggests that they were already aware of it from introspection. Unlike PR4, none of the
variables is signiﬁcant. This lack of signiﬁcance is consistent with rational behavior. Cutoff
by othersis negative andcutoff by jis positive in sign, although neither is signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level. Thus there is may be a slight tendency toward reciprocal behavior. A positive
cutoffbyjindicatesthatplayeriismorelikelytocutoffanotherplayerwhocuthimoffearlier,
and a negative cutoff by others means that i reacts to a cutoff from k by being less likely
to cutoff j, positively reciprocating not being cutoff by j. Thus it appears that the price is
right bidding game with four players and resale is too complex for the behavioral principles
typically observed in the laboratory to manifest themselves. However, the relatively simple
game in PN3 generates data that is highly consistent with rational behavior.
5. Discussion
In this study, we replicate many empirical patterns that BHV identify in their data from
the price is right television show bidding game. For example, we ﬁnd that at the beginning
of our sessions, the incidence of cutoff behavior is roughly the same as in the BHV study.
The probability of a player winning the prize given his position in the bidding order is very
close in the two studies. We also reproduce the very diffuse results BHV obtain on the order
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attain parallel outcomes with corresponding ﬁeld data, even though the stakes on the game
show are several hundred times greater than the two dollar prizes in our experiment and the
game show is conducted in a natural setting.
In our PR4 data, which corresponds to the game played on the television show, the
subgame perfect equilibrium was not an accurate predictor of the actual bids. However, we
show that reducing the number of players to three, eliminating the possibility of resale of
the item, and giving participants some practice with the game induces decisions that are




the game generally behaves in a manner consistent with standard theory. Behavior in PN3
cannot be classiﬁed as “anomalous”.
We believe that the treatments PR4 and PN3 behave differently for two reasons. The ﬁrst
is that the existence of resale introduces additional subgames that are off the equilibrium
path and that are reached when all players bid higher than the experimenter price. Their
existence increases the number of contingencies that a player must analyze at each of his
decision nodes. Although they are not reached in equilibrium, these subgames are likely
to be reached in the early periods when subjects are becoming familiar with the decision
context. The fact that these subgames are reached complicates the calculation of expected
payoffs for different actions at earlier decision nodes. The realization of relatively high
payoffs out of equilibrium can result in reinforcement of actions (see for example, Erev
and Roth, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999) that lie off of the equilibrium path and make their
use persistent. We conjecture that more generally, subgame perfection will predict better
whentherearefeweroutofequilibriumoutcomes,particularlythosethatresultinrelatively
high payoffs for one or more players.
A three-player version of the game simpliﬁes the decisions of early movers in the game
becauseitismorelikelythattheyhaveconﬁdencethatalllatermoverswillinductbackwards.
Thismakesiteasiertocreatethecommonknowledgeofrationalitythatsubgameperfection
requires. However, it also improves the decisions of the last mover, whose decisions were
closer to optimality under PN3 than under PN4. This appears to occur because decisions of
all three players stabilize more quickly, meaning there are relatively few actions of earlier
bidders to which the last mover must respond. Repeated experience with similar actions
of previous movers facilitates the calculation of optimal best response to those actions
and thus the creation of common knowledge of rationality on the part of earlier players.
The complexity of the four-player game with resale prevents this from occurring, because
decisions are highly variable from period to period. It may be the case that in general,
games with fewer players are more likely to converge to and achieve subgame perfect
outcomes because of the relative ease of making it common knowledge that players are
rational.
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